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On the Theoretical Foundations for Regulating Financial Markets1

Katharina Pistor2

Abstract:
How we think about financial markets determines how we regulate them. Since the 1970s
modern finance theory has shaped how we think about and regulate financial markets. It
is based on the notion that markets are or can be made (more) efficient. Financial markets
have been deregulated when they were thought to achieve efficient outcomes on their
own; and regulation was designed to lend crutches to them when it appeared that they
needed support. While modern finance theory has suffered some setbacks in the
aftermath of the global crisis, defenders hold that improving market efficiency should
still be the overriding concern for regulation. This essay raises the question whether this
is indeed the case. What if other factors besides information costs affect the vulnerability
of markets to crises? Two factors have been identified in the literature: Imperfect
Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraint. This essay introduces the relevant theories that
focus on these factors and discusses their regulatory implications.
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Introduction

In the aftermath of the global crisis long-held views about financial markets have
come under pressure. Questions have been raised whether financial markets are indeed
efficient and whether the deregulation of financial markets that was justified by the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (EMH) has caused more harm than good.3 Most of
the current critiques of EMH center around three issues: whether market actors are indeed
rational, autonomous actors or instead beset by herd behavior; 4 whether markets are
3

For an insightful review of these debates in different countries and how post-crisis debates relate to precrisis ones, see JULIE FROUD et al., Stories and Interests in Finance: Agendas of Governance before and
after the Financial Crisis, 25 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and
Institutions 35-39 (2012).
4
This critique has been articulated by the literature on behavioral finance. See, for example, GEORGE A.
AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it
Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton University Press. 2009).
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fundamentally or “informationally” efficient 5 ; and whether markets or regulators are
better able to make allocative decisions.6
This debate can be understood only within the dominant framework employed for
conceptualizing financial markets. It assumes that financial markets are no different from
the market for ordinary tradable goods and that, therefore, the general equilibrium models
that have been developed for tradable goods apply to finance just as well. A very
different perspective is offered by theories that seek to explain the operation of real world
financial systems and their empirically manifested trend towards instability. The two
critical ingredients that have been identified by these alternative theories are Imperfect
Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraint.7
The insight that knowledge is imperfect can be traced back to the work of Knight,8
Keynes9 and Minsky.10 Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg have recently extended it
to their theory of “Imperfect Knowledge Economics” (IKE). 11 They share with

5

RONALD GILSON & REINIER KRAAKMAN, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Virginia Law Review
549 (1984) at 613.
6
There is broad consensus among lawyers and economists that markets are superior. For the basic
theoretical argument see Louis De Alessi, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay
in Economic Theory, 73 American Economic Review 64-81 (1983). On public vs. private entities, see
Aidan R. Vining & Anthony E. Boardman, Ownership versus competition: Efficiency in public enterprise,
73 Public Choice 205-239 (1992).
7
The concept of Illiquidity and Imperfect Knowledge Constraints are derived from the literature. I have
taken the liberty to coin them in this fashion and capitalize them.
8
FRANK H. KNIGHT, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin. 1921).
9
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Harcourt, Inc. 1964
(1936)) at 248, explaining that investing in the future is a key aspect of capitalist economies; yet
information about the past is insufficient to predict the future.
10
Building on Keynes’s work, Minsky argues that the inability to predict the future in combination with
price competition leads actors in financial markets to adopt financing strategies that destabilize the system
over time. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (Yale University Press. 1986) at 230.
11
ROMAN FRYDMAN & MICHAEL D. GOLDBERG, Imperfect Knowledge Economics (Princeton University
Press. 2007); see also their most recent book, which is accessible to a broader audience, in which they
restate the IKE theory and suggest some regulatory implications. ROMAN FRYDMAN & MICHAEL D.
GOLDBERG, Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State (Princeton
University Press. 2011). It should be noted that for now they limit their theory to macroeconomics.
However, they do not preclude the possibility that the theory could be extended into a general theory of
financial economics. See ibid at 256.
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proponents of EMH the notion that fundamentals drive asset prices. Yet, according to
IKE, markets do not trend towards equilibrium outcomes, as posited by EMH and its
cousin, the Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH). Instead, imperfect knowledge is
responsible for almost the opposite result, namely extreme asset price swings. The reason
is that prices do not track an assumed intrinsic value; rather, they reflect the struggle of
market participants to determine asset value in light of a constantly changing
environment. The reversal of asset prices can be extremely costly for the real economy,
as price adjustments can trigger economy-wide deleveraging, which is associated with
economic recession and, in the worst-case scenario, depression. This, in the eyes of
Frydman and Goldberg, makes the case for government intervention to prevent extreme
asset price swings. In the world of IKE, imperfect knowledge is an existential factor that
cannot be altered and will lead to an endogenous process of extreme asset prices swings
as market participants continue to pursue existing strategies until they observe many
others changing strategy. Financial regulation is therefore not limited to information
enhancement, but takes a more proactive stand to avoid financial crises and economic
hardship.
The Liquidity Constraint has been articulated by Keynes and Minsky and is at the
heart of Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis”.12 It is closely intertwined with the
Imperfect Knowledge Constraint. Because we have imperfect knowledge about the
future, we employ financing strategies that are informed by current knowledge. However,
12

For a review of Minsky’s contribution to finance theory, see PERRY MEHRLING, The Vision of Hyman
Minsky, 39 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations 129-158 (1999). See also Mehrling’s analysis
of the failure of Long Term Capital Management in light of Minsky’s theory. PERRY MEHRLING, Minsky
and Modern Finance: The Case of Long Term Capital Management, Winter 2000 Journal of Portfolio
Management 81-89 (2000). Mehrling himself extends Minsky’s analysis to contemporary financial markets
in PERRY MEHRLING, The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort (Princeton
University Press. 2011), hereinafter Mehrling (2011a).
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extrapolation from the present to the future, which is unknowable, may be off the mark.
This causes market participants to radically alter their strategy when the future arrives.
We may well have overestimated the ability to pay bills from earned income as they
become due, or the willingness of others to refinance debt should obligations exceed
current revenue. This follows from the principle of Imperfect Knowledge. When doubts
about the ability of intermediaries to pay their bills or to refinance their debt spread, the
Liquidity Constraint comes into its own. Refinancing current and financing future
positions will be cut back, resulting in a downward price adjustment and potential
deleveraging or fire sale of assets. This follows from the simple fact that, in the words of
Keynes, “there is no such thing as liquidity for the community as a whole”.13
The end result of this process can be a financial, or worse, an economic crisis.
Proponents of both Imperfect Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraint theories therefore
postulate that instability of financial markets is an endogenously driven process. 14
However, there are also important differences between the two approaches. According to
Minsky, economic systems are a matter of social choices and institutional arrangements
that may be more or less conducive to instability. In contrast, Frydman and Goldberg
abstract from institutions as well as from liquidity and focus on self-correcting asset price
swings as the trigger of crises, and imperfect knowledge as their root cause.
Perry Mehrling builds on Minsky’s work and places liquidity at the center of his
analysis. Liquidity is elastic, with its relative elasticity being determined by the

13

Keynes, supra note 9 at 155.
See also JEAN TIROLE, Liquidity and All its Friends, 49 Journal of Economic Literature 287-325 (2011)
at 320, suggesting that “when everyone engages in maturity transformation, authorities have little choice
but facilitating refinancing, and so refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity.” It
follows that there will be multiple equilibria and that contrary to Capital Asset Pricing Models (discussed
infra), “it is in the interest of each bank to be illiquid.”

14
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management of the overall (public and private) credit supply.15 The financial system is
depicted as a credit system. Every unit in the economy is a bank, each with its own
balance sheet comprising assets and liabilities. Assets held on the balance sheet of one
unit have their mirror image in the liabilities of another. Each seeks to balance its books.
When liabilities exceed assets, a unit seeks to balance assets and liabilities by deferring
payments to its creditors, by seeking short-term financing to fill the gap, or by selling
assets to generate cash. If all fail, it will default, forcing its creditors to make up for the
difference in order to balance their own books. This in turn pushes the chain of
unmatched liabilities from creditor to creditor and up the ladder of the financial system to
whoever is willing or capable to step in as lender of last resort (LLR). Historically, this
role has been played at times by private agents, such as Mr. J.P. Morgan in the financial
crisis of 1907,16 but nowadays it is typically filled by the central bank – in the US, the
Federal Reserve (the Fed).
An important motive for financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage from this
perspective is the search by market actors for strategies to increase the elasticity of the
Liquidity Constraint each of them faces. The task of those overseeing this system – the
LLR and its agents – is to balance the elasticity of the liquidity of the system as a whole
with a view on promoting growth, while avoiding high levels of volatility and
destabilization.
Modern finance theory does not ignore imperfect knowledge or liquidity issues, but
relegates them to subordinate roles. The Imperfect Knowledge Constraint is typically

15

This is a clear departure from the monetarists who focus entirely on the money supply. See Mehrling,
supra note 12 at 58, but also Minsky (1986), supra note 10 at 182.
16
ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect
Storm (John Wiley & Sons. 2007).
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reinterpreted as an information problem;17 and the Liquidity Constraint boiled down to a
moral hazard issue, as when financial intermediaries are seeking a bailout. 18 If, in
contrast, the Imperfect Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraints are put at center stage,
information costs are demoted to a matter of secondary importance. The Imperfect
Knowledge Constraint tells us that no matter how much information is revealed ex ante,
information about the past or present does not equal knowledge about the future. It
follows that the focus on information in financial market regulation is insufficient. It may
even be counter-productive because it creates the appearance that better information can
convert the fundamental problem of uncertainty into a probability calculation, even
though every probability calculation uses assumptions based on what we can know today,
which may turn out to be wrong tomorrow.19 Worse, the belief that better information can
ultimately drive markets towards efficiency may prevent legislatures and regulators from
pursuing alternative, and potentially superior, strategies for governing financial markets.
The theories that invoke the Liquidity Constraint go a step further still. They suggest
that neither information shortage, nor imperfect knowledge can explain the scale of
financial crises we observe in the real world. Absent the Liquidity Constraint, there is no
reason why assets can no longer be sold when new information is revealed and
knowledge upgraded to the present. The root cause of financial crisis is that at that time
there are few takers of assets, as most market participants will strive to obtain cash to pay
17

See infra the discussion under II.A.
The Liquidity Constraint can also be portrayed as an information problem. See Tirole, supra note 14 at
298, suggesting that one of the reasons for the breakdown of market liquidity, i.e. the ability to sell assets
against cash, is information asymmetry. Note, however, that he does not limit the analysis to this point and
instead suggests that endogenous market processes can result in liquidity breakdowns. See ibid note 16.
Moreover, he concludes his analysis by pointing out that recognition of the Liquidity Constraint has
regulatory implications that are not fully understood and that advancements require, among others, a
convergence of micro and macroeconomics. See Tirole supra note 14 at 323.
19
This is essentially why the Value at Risk model that was widely followed by investors prior to the crisis
went spectacularly wrong. See Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 244.
18
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off their own liabilities as they become due.20 They will therefore seek to sell assets and
if all do the same at the same time can trigger a fire sale of assets that drives down prices
across the economy.
In short, theory matters for how we regulate, because it determines how we think
about markets and how we define the purpose of regulation. If there is more than one
theory that helps us understand how financial markets operate and what regulation might
accomplish, it is useful to consider their respective merits. To be sure, disputes over
regulatory theories take a long time to resolve – often too long for legislatures or
regulators who need to respond to market developments and crises immediately.
However, even without a conclusive resolution of the theoretical debates, a better
understanding of different theories and their regulatory implications might be helpful.
Different theories may come to similar conclusions on specific issues, thereby lending
greater support to a particular regulatory intervention. Moreover, having a menu of
options may be superior to a fixed course, especially if the last time the fixed course was
on offer emergency care was required afterwards – whether or not we can establish
causality between the two events. Last, but not least, in a world of so many unknowns,
experimentation with multiple regulatory strategies may result in better outcomes than
placing all bets on one card.21

II.

The Theoretical Foundations of Finance

20

Keynes suggests that a collapse of equity prices “may have been due to the weakening either of
speculative confidence or of the state of credit”, where the “state of credit” is defined as “the confidence of
the lending institutions towards those who seek to borrow from them.” Keynes, supra note 9 at 158.
21
On this point, see ROBERTA ROMANO, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Banking
Institutions: Rethinking the Basel Architecture, unpublished MS on file with author (2011) at 66.

8

This part of the essay introduces different theories of finance and their core features.
We begin with the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (EMH), which has been the
backbone of modern financial theories and regulatory approaches. We then turn to
theories that use the Imperfect Knowledge and Liquidity Constraints respectively to
explain the operation of financial markets. A comparison of the three theories with the
greatest policy relevance today will conclude the section.

A.

Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis

EMH holds that in a world without transaction and information costs markets will
allocate capital to the most efficient use. Prices will incorporate all relevant information
and the price mechanism will therefore ensure an efficient outcome.22 An important step
in the development of EMH was an empirical observation, the famous random walk of
stock prices. The fact that markets did not follow a pattern that could be predicted from
price movements in the past suggested that financial markets themselves could be
analyzed as competitive markets with equilibrium outcomes. After all, independence of
past and present price and the implied absence of arbitrage opportunities suggested stable
equilibria.23 This “no arbitrage” paradigm, most famously stated by Samuelson in 1965,24

22

Efficiency in this context is typically defined as Pareto efficiency, meaning that no further transaction
will make anyone better off without making others worse off. However, given that markets in the real
world do not necessarily resemble fully Pareto efficient markets, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has become the
preferred benchmark among legal academics. It requires only a net social benefit but assumes that the
actual costs of different transactions and their implications can be assessed with reasonable accuracy. In
combination with the notion that markets may only be relatively efficient, this leaves ample room for
judgment calls and ideational debates when assessing the pros and cons of different regulatory strategies.
23
See See PERRY MEHRLING, Financial Economics, unpublished MS on file with author (2011) at 6.
Hereinafter Merhling (2011b).
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became the foundation for the new fundamental theory of asset pricing. It posited the
existence of a positive linear pricing rule, implying that assets that were not yet widely
traded could be priced by reference to assets that were. 25 This gave rise to financial
engineering and the development of sophisticated financial instruments, including overthe-counter (OTC) derivatives that were priced and sold even in the absence of an already
existing market.26
EMH and the theorem of “no arbitrage in efficient markets” did not remain without
doubters. Samuelson himself disclosed in his original paper that he had hesitated to
publish the theorem for almost ten years. When he did eventually publish it he warned
against drawing far-reaching normative implications. In his words, the efficiency theorem
does not prove that actual competitive markets work well. It does not say that
speculation is a good thing or that randomness of price changes would be a good
thing. It does not prove that anyone who makes money in speculation is ipso facto
deserving of the gain or even that he has accomplished something good for
society or for himself. All or none of these may by true, but that would require a
different investigation.27

24

See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 Industrial
Management Review 41-49 (1965) at 44: “… there is no way of making an expected profit by extrapolating
past changes in the future price, by chart or any other esoteric devices of magic or mathematics. The market
quotation (…) already contains in itself all that can be known about the future and in that sense has
discounted future contingencies as much as is humanly possible (or inhumanly possible within the axiom of
the model).”
25
See Mehrling (2011a), supra note 12 at 7. See also DONALD MACKENZIE, An Engine, Not a Camera:
How Financial Models Shape Markets (The MIT Press. 2006) at 139/140, suggesting that the no arbitrage
principle was further developed by Cox and Ross into a “general, elegant account in which option prices
were determined by the absence of arbitrage opportunities. (…) For Ross, models of stock prices and
option theory were not separate endeavors. (…) Assets that were substitutes for each other – stocks with the
same sensitivity to underlying risk factors; and option and its replicating portfolio – had to have the same
price, for otherwise there was an arbitrage opportunity.”
26
See Mehrling, supra note 12 at 7. Note that OTC derivatives are customized and therefore lack the
standard features otherwise presumed to be critical for the development of a deep and liquid market in
financial instruments. The rise of the OTC derivatives markets is therefore closely associated with the
widely shared belief that the price of these papers can be inferred from other assets. For a powerful
argument for how finance theory has shaped the way financial markets operate, see MacKenzie, supra note
25, invoking the concept of performativity to suggest that markets came to resemble the models that were
used to explain them. Specifically on the random walk theory and the EMH, see ibid at pp. 57.
27
Samuelson, supra note 24 at 48.
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These warnings were to little avail. Whether he had intended to or not, Samuelson
had transformed an empirical observation into a general theorem, the Rational
Expectation Hypothesis (REH). The end result was a “normative theory” of asset
markets, according to which, in the words of Frydman and Goldberg,
barring informational asymmetries and other market failures, markets populated
by rational individuals are stable, in the sense that they set prices to fluctuate
randomly around intrinsic value.28 (emphasis added)

Legal academics, judges and regulators quickly absorbed this theory, which has come
to deeply inform financial market regulation in the US and elsewhere. 29 In a seminal
paper published in 1984, Professors Gilson and Kraakman explained the critical role law
and legal institutions play in enhancing market efficiency.30 The SEC used EMH as a
reference point for developing its integrated disclosure strategies for securities markets.31
Last, but not least, the US Supreme Court embraced EMH in 1988 in its “Fraud on the
Market Theory”:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the
available material information regarding the company and its business. (…)
Misleading statements will therefore (…) defraud purchasers of stock even if the
purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. (…) The causal connection
between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case
is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.32

28

Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 94.
The primary transmission channel to other parts of the world has been the standardization of financial
regulation on ‘best practice’ models as exemplified by the US. See KATHARINA PISTOR, The
Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 American Journal of Comparative Law
101-134 (2002).
30
See Gilson and Kraakman (1984) supra note 5 at 549-50, suggesting that even at the time of their writing,
EMH already informed academic literatures, had made inroads into legal textbooks and was structuring
debates about future securities regulation.
31
For details, see PAOLO CIOPPA, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis Revisted: Implications of the
Economic Model for the United States Regulator, 5 Global Jurist Advances Article 3 (2005).
32
BASIC INC. v. LEVINSON, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) at 255; Note that the Supreme Court insists that it is
not assessing the validity of the theory, only whether lower courts were correct in invoking it.
29
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In short, investors could rely on prices as the carrier of all relevant information. They
were therefore able to charge directors who had failed to disclose what appeared to be
valuable information with fraudulent conduct, even when the investors were unable to
show that they had taken note of and acted upon any specific piece of information, such
as an oral or written statement, but instead had relied on the market price.33
EMH has survived crises and crashes, the possibility of which it rules out
categorically. After all, efficient markets are supposed to be stable; they trend towards
equilibrium, not disequilibrium. Crises therefore have to be attributed to exogenous
effects, i.e. to events outside the financial system, which are typically characterized as
shocks to the system rather than evidence of flaws in the theory used to describe and
analyze it. 34 Alternatively, the causes for a crisis must be found in information
inefficiency, such information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders.35
One of the most ominous aspects of EMH has been the notion of “intrinsic value”.
Judges have grown increasingly wary of what that might be and how it should be
determined. 36 Some of this was already apparent in the dissenting opinion by Justice
White in the Supreme Court case that was decided in 1988:
At the bottom of the Court's conclusion that the fraud-on-the-market theory
sustains a presumption of reliance is the assumption that individuals rely "on the
integrity of the market price" when buying or selling stock in "impersonal, welldeveloped market[s] for securities." (….) it is this aspect of the fraud-on-the33

Reliance is a critical component in proving causality between misleading facts and harm. Effectively,
EMH paved the way for securities class action suits in cases where market prices changed considerably
after the disclosure of sensitive facts.
34
The 1987 stock market crash was thus attributed to electronic trading patterns; financial crises in
emerging markets to bad institutions and regulatory ineptitude; the dot com crash to a few ‘bad apples’; and
the subprime mortgage crisis to government policies aimed at increasing home ownership.
35
Foundational for this argument see Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information, 71 American Economic Review 393-410 (1981).
36
See PAUL A. FERRILLO et al., The less than efficient Capital Market Hypothesis: Requiring more Proof,
St. John's Law Review 78 (2004), suggesting the courts are asking for more proof than the original
formulation of the fraud on the market theory, though ambiguous, might have suggested.
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market hypothesis which most mystifies me. (…) [I]t implicitly suggests that
stocks have some "true value" that is measurable by a standard other than their
market price. While the scholastics of medieval times professed a means to make
such a valuation of a commodity's "worth," I doubt that the federal courts of our
day are similarly equipped.37
For most advocates of EMH, its power derives from scientific truths.38 They would
therefore reject scholasticism as unscientific. Yet, the duality of intrinsic and market
value is built into the theory and is not an invention of judges or scholastics. EMH
postulates that market prices reflect what the equilibrium outcome would be in a world
consistent with the basic assumptions of the Rational Expectation Hypothesis.39 Eugene
Fama, the originator of the random walk theory, himself conceded that in competitive
markets there is sufficient disagreement to make the determination of the intrinsic value
elusive. 40 Nonetheless, he posited that, in accordance with the Rational Expectation
Hypothesis, prices should be assumed to fluctuate around intrinsic value.41
The wide support of EMH in legal quarters may strike some as surprising. In its
strongest form EMH makes law superfluous and should therefore drive lawyers and
academics in the fields of corporate or securities law out of business or law schools. After
all, if the market prices all relevant information, then all investors have to do is track that
price. Any further protection is either useless or distorts the operation of the market.
However, this conclusion follows only if markets have already achieved efficiency. If, in
contrast, markets are not quite efficient but could be engineered to become more so, then
there is a central role for law and lawyers. Specifically, law can help explain why markets
37

Supra note 32 at 255. Emphasis added.
See Gilson and Kraakman (1984), supra note 30 at 549, who begin their elaboration with a long review
of the overwhelming empirical evidence that financial markets suggest efficient outcomes.
39
Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 65.
40
See EUGENE FAMA, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 Journal of
Finance 383-417 (1970) at 65. See also Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 93, quoting him.
41
Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 94.
38
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may appear as if they were efficient, even though real world experience teaches us that
transaction and information costs stand in the way of full efficiency. That is the
contribution Gilson and Kraakman made in their 1984 piece in which they argued that
specific institutional mechanisms contribute to the relative efficiency of markets. 42
Moreover, if it turns out that markets don’t always act efficiently, lawyers can pave the
way for making them more efficient.43 Once legal scholars had demonstrated that markets
need crutches to become efficient and had identified a series of useful support
mechanisms, the field of law was open for designing regulation, analyzing regulatory
failures, and suggesting regulatory reforms – all in view of making markets efficient.
The main argument in support of EMH even after the global crisis is that markets are
not born efficient, but that they can be made relatively efficient by institutional and legal
crutches. 44 How this altered concept of efficiency squares with the original EMH
assumption that markets are efficient and therefore stable remains unexplained. If
markets are only informationally efficient do they tilt towards equilibrium or fragility? Is
this outcome socially desirable, and if so, why? Recall Samuelson’s warning that the
proof of the theorem of market efficiency had nothing to say about its normative
desirability. Presumably he would have been even more skeptical about the notion that
relatively efficient markets are social welfare enhancing.

42

They distinguish typologies of trading based on the level and source of information available to them.
They also suggest that different mechanisms operate in different markets to make them efficient. For
details, see Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 30 at esp. Figure One at 590.
43
See the discussion of policy implication in RONALD J. GILSON and REINIER KRAAKMAN, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 Journal of Corporation Law
715-742 (2003) at 738.
44
Critically, however, on over-reliance of regulation to enhance market efficiency, Jonathan R. Macey, The
Value of Reputation in Corporate Finance and Investment Banking (and the Related Roles of Regulation
and Market Efficiency), 22 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 18-30 (2010).
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The standard answer to these questions by adherence of the EMH is that regulators
will be no better and arguably worse at allocating resources than markets. That, of course,
assumes that there are only two ways of governing financial markets: enhancing
efficiency through institutional design or taking over decision making from market actors
in a move akin to central planning associated with the socialist system, now in demise. In
contrast, the theories discussed below suggest that there is room, indeed a need, for
alternative institutional and regulatory approaches, and that it may be time to move
beyond the simple state vs. market dichotomy in the debate about financial regulation.
B.

Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE)

Imperfect Knowledge Economics uses a very different point of departure than EMH,
namely that markets are inherently instable. “Instability is an inherent feature of capitalist
economies, perhaps nowhere more markedly so than in modern financial markets”. 45
Long swings in asset prices, which frequently lead to “painful shifts in consumption and
investment patterns”,46 are manifestations of this instability. The major objective of IKE
therefore is to explain observable swings in asset prices.
IKE also postulates that market participants are aware of the fact that financial
systems are inherently instable and that knowledge is imperfect.47 This is why, contrary
to modern finance theory, market actors do not operate as robots following a single
strategy to the end irrespective of any headwinds or other obstacles. Instead, rational
individuals devise strategies to deal with imperfect knowledge on a day-to-day, minute-
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to-minute basis as they adjust their trading and investment strategies. These strategies lie
at the heart of empirically observable long-term swings in asset prices, which can wreak
havoc on financial and economic systems if allowed to swing excessively. In light of
these realities, the attempt by financial economics to capture complex economic systems
with mechanical, predetermined and fully specified models – namely EMH and REH – is
deemed futile.48
The starting point of this analysis is a rather conventional definition of what financial
markets do. They “provide assessments of the relative prospect of companies’ assets”;
“set prices” to reflect “expected return on past investments” as well as “new investments
for which new capital is sought”; and “allocate capital based on these price signals”.49
Most EMH proponents would agree with this definition. Where IKE departs from EMH
is in its emphasis on two features of contemporary markets: “nonroutine change” and
“imperfect knowledge”.
In modern economies, individuals and companies engage in innovative activities,
discovering new ways to use existing physical and human capital, and new
technologies. The institutional and broader social context within which this
entrepreneurial activity takes place also changes in novel ways. And innovation
itself influences the future returns from economic activity in ways that no one can
fully foresee.50

Imperfect knowledge both follows from and explains nonroutine change. Because
economic change is nonroutine, investment decisions are also “inherently nonroutine”.51
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Nonetheless, individuals invest in the expectation of future returns, which makes
corrections inevitable at some point in the future when knowledge is enhanced. These
corrections themselves constitute nonroutine events with potentially disruptive effects not
only for the financial system, but also for the real economy.
IKE agrees with proponents of EMH – and by implication disagrees with at least
some proponents of behavioral economics – that market participants act purposefully
when they invest. However, they cannot know the future and cannot simply extrapolate it
from the past; they can use existing information and knowledge to devise a strategy to
follow until new information becomes available or events occur that demand change.
This is the reason that traders and analysts are constantly hunting for new information
and for clues to assess its relevance: it helps them to determine whether to stick to a
strategy or abandon it. The prices generated in this fashion represent the relative value of
different assets at a given moment in time. The asset value in turn influences a unit’s
access to finance.
In the aggregate, the purposeful behavior of all traders exhibits regularities. Yet,
because of imperfect knowledge and nonroutine change these regularities can “become or
cease to be relevant at times that cannot be fully specified in advance”.52 The tipping
point occurs when enough traders begin to change the strategy they had devised earlier, if
only cautiously. If and when followed by others, this change in direction can move asset
prices market-wide – until a sufficient number of traders changes course again.
These insights have led Frydman and Goldberg to dismantle the Rational Expectation
Hypothesis (REH) and its cousin, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). REH states
that the behavior of market participants “will ensure that asset prices reflect nearly
52
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perfectly their mythical true longer-term values, thereby ensuring nearly perfect
allocation of society’s capital”.53 They call the true long-term value “mythical” because it
cannot be known to individuals or the “market”, or even to academic economists. Yet, for
economists to derive consistent models (which has become the mantra of academic
finance), the assumption that markets can be reliably forecasted is crucial. An important
implication is that market participants “never revise their forecasting strategies in ways
that they, or an economist’s Rational Expectation model, have not foreseen.”54
EMH too is rejected as “castles in the air”. 55 EMH asserts that prices reflect all
(publicly) available information. An asset’s inherent or true value is derived from the net
present value of its current and future investment projects. Calculating this value assumes
that market participants know future prices and dividend changes56 – when in fact they do
not and cannot know them.
While for standard economics a rejection of REH and EMH amounts to depriving
financial markets of their very purpose, IKE suggests, to the contrary, that if EMH held
true there would be little reason for financial markets to exist. The very purpose of
financial markets, their raison d’être, is the assessment of assets and the allocation of
resources in a world of imperfect knowledge with non-routine change. Markets may not
be perfect, but they “are the best institutions on offer”.57 In the words of Frydman and
Goldberg,
there is something fundamentally absurd about the Efficient Market Hypothesis. It
is based on the idea that individuals are profit seeking, but it supposes that the
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masses of market participants who do use available information in an effort to
earn above-average returns are merely wasting their time.58
As an alternative, Frydman and Goldberg propose the Contingent Market Hypothesis
(CMH), which states that
[T]he causal process underpinning price movements depends on available
information, which includes observations concerning fundamental factors specific
to each market. (....) This process cannot be adequately described by an
overarching model, defined as a rule that exactly relates market outcomes to
available information up to a fully predetermined random error at all time periods,
past, present, and future.59

As this definition suggests, CMH emphasizes the processes by which new
information or events make their way into the pricing of assets. This is accomplished by a
dynamic interplay of short-term speculative traders and long-term value investors.
Speculators are concerned with short-term returns and base their trading decisions on
“news about short-term trends”, but on “a wide array of fundamental factors”.60 Their
time horizon hardly extends beyond the coming months or quarters and they focus on
“clues about returns on companies’ shares”.
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information, i.e. earnings, sales and costs, as well as information about the state of the
economy, such as “future interest rates, inflation, and other fundamental factors that
influence companies’ short-term prospects”.62
In comparison, long-term “value” investors buy stocks that they believe are
undervalued and hold them for an extensive period of time.63 They too cannot know how
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the value of an asset will change over the time period they intend to hold it, no matter
how many resources they put into background research. This is where speculative
investors come in. Short-term investors respond to new information and events and
thereby help track the “unfolding prospects of projects and companies”.64 The short-term
trading activities help validate or falsify the bets long-term investors made by indicating
how these bets might materialize. Speculators benefit value investors in other ways as
well: They are the ones who buy their newly appreciated shares and thereby ensure that
they can realize their value.
Thus, far from turning an asset market into a casino,65 or endangering the stability of
the system by introducing speculative elements as Minsky argued, according to Frydman
and Goldberg short-term speculative investors play a valuable, if paradoxical, role in
financial markets.
The debate has largely failed to recognize that speculation is inherent to how
financial markets perform their essential role in modern economies, which would
imply the need to focus on harnessing speculation to improve capital allocation
and curbing excesses that might cause a future crisis.66

The need to curb excesses does not follow from some inability of markets to selfcorrect. Frydman and Goldberg argue that they can and will do so eventually as more and
more traders revise their trading strategy in light of new information, events, or in a
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reflexive mode67 because others have done so. However, this self-correction may come
too late. Traders are motivated by profits and as long as they observe information about
fundamentals that supports the continuation of a bullish trend, they will continue to bid
up the price of assets, even if they believe it to be excessive. They can do so because they
do not internalize the “economic and social costs associated with such excesses”.68 This
is where the state, law and regulation come in: “This externality, then, rationalizes a role
for the state in asset markets beyond setting the rules of the game”.69
In short, EMH and IKE are both concerned with the causes of disorder, where
disorder is defined as the deviation of asset prices from some benchmark. 70 For EMH the
benchmark is an idealized norm, such as a stable equilibrium outcome, or some intrinsic
value (if only assumed). IKE rejects an idealized norm and offers as an alternative the
empirically observable historical range of asset prices.
An interesting question is how IKE and REMH relate to one another. Both theories
reject the notion of “intrinsic” value and take a more pragmatic approach for analyzing
and assessing market developments. For Gilson and Kraakman, EMH serves as a
benchmark for assessing informational efficiency, whereas Frydman and Goldberg use
historical data to determine extreme asset price swings. The two theories differ, however,
in their take on financial stability vs. instability. As discussed, Gilson and Kraakman do
not explicitly address the question of stability, but they seem to assume that the more
informationally efficient markets are, the more stable they ought to be. This explains their
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regulatory approach, namely to further reduce information costs. In contrast, Frydman
and Goldberg assume instability as an inherent feature of financial markets. Extreme
asset price swings are not caused by a shortage of information, and informational
remedies will therefore be ineffective. Instead, they are produced by endogenous
processes that are associated with the decentralized valuation of assets in an everchanging world. The major purpose of regulation is to coordinate the correction of
investment strategies before asset prices reach extreme levels. This will be further
discussed infra under III.
C.

Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis

Just as IKE, Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) starts from the notion of
uncertainty. Minsky developed his theory on the basis of Keynes’s insight expressed in
his “General Theory”71 that capitalism owes its existence, vibrancy, but also its tendency
to destabilize, to a financial system. Capitalist economies not only trade, they also
produce; more importantly, they invest. This makes a financial system indispensable,
indeed foundational, for capitalism. For Minsky, uncertainty is part and parcel of every
investment decision. The decision to invest involves a “supply function of investment,
which depends upon labor costs and short-term interest rates, a demand function of
investment, which is derived from the price of capital assets, and the anticipated structure
and conditions of financing”.72 This implies that there is an “element of uncertainty in
the decision to invest that has nothing to do with whether the investment will perform as
the technologists indicated and whether the market for the product of the investment will
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be strong. This element of uncertainty centers on the mix of internal and external
financing that will be needed”.73
Financing means the exchange of money now against commitments to pay in the
future. Such commitments come in different forms, including notes, bonds, shares,
deposits, and insurance policies. Some are short-term, others are long-term; some have a
fixed time horizon, others an open time horizon. The list of financial instruments or
capital assets is open-ended. Financial innovation, i.e. the creation of new financial
instruments, is a hallmark of market based credit systems, in which individual market
participants need to balance their own accounts, yet face the constant threat that one or
more of its borrowers or counter parties might default. In good times close substitutes to
cash relax the survival constraints of individual players. In bad times, however, all
payment commitments and all financial instruments must be convertible into cash.74
The main motivation for financial innovation, according to Minsky, is profit, which
can be generated by managing capital assets. Capital assets are expected to yield income,
or quasi-rents – i.e. the difference between the total revenue generated from selling
output of current goods and the actual out-of-pocket costs for the production of such
goods.75 Only when quasi-rents are realized within the expected time frame can the costs
of financing and producing these goods be covered from income. Otherwise refinancing
becomes necessary.
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Minsky follows Keynes’s argument that in the process of financing investments and
taking positions on capital assets, money is created. 76 As long as bankers and firms
believe, based on information available to them, that the investments or quasi-rents
derived from capital assets will finance the payments due on debt, they will be inclined to
make funds available for new investments or for refinancing, and in the process they
produce more money. Conversely, when their views change, finance will be cut back. At
the aggregate level, these actions result in an increase or decrease in the supply of money
– i.e. in claims that are, in principle, convertible into cash.
The fact that the act of financing produces money has important implications for the
functioning of the pricing system for capital assets. In Minsky’s view, the basic static
model with intersecting supply-demand curves used to explain the pricing system for
current goods misses core features for the pricing of capital assets. Neither can pricing of
capital assets be reduced to the allocation of resources (as assumed by proponents of
EMH) or the distribution of income. Rather, “in a capitalist economy resource allocation
and price determination are integrated with the financing of outputs, positions in capital
assets, and the validating of liabilities”.77 In other words, the cost of financing affects
asset prices.
The structure of financial commitments and the types of cash flow used to meet
obligations as they become due are critical for determining the relative stability of an
economic system. Minsky argues that there are essentially three types of cash flow:
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income, balance sheet, and portfolio. 78 Income cash flow results from the process of
production and includes wages and salaries, payments for intermediate and final goods,
and gross profits after taxes. Balance sheet cash flows are used to meet existing liabilities,
both principal and interest. 79 Lastly, portfolio cash flows result from financial assets
changing hands: The buying or selling of assets and the issuance of new liabilities
generates portfolio cash flows.
How individual “units” (households, firms, municipalities, the government) and the
economy as a whole prioritize among these different forms of cash flows to meet their
obligations determines the degree of a system’s financial (in)stability. A stable economy
is one in which most entities use income cash flows most of the time to meet payment
commitments on the outstanding liabilities. Minsky calls this “hedge financing”. When
the balance sheet cash flows are larger than the expected receipts from income, the unit
will have to engage in speculative or even Ponzi finance. Speculative finance describes a
situation where borrowing becomes necessary to meet current obligations, but it is
expected that future cash receipts will cover cash payments. Speculative finance morphs
into Ponzi finance when it is expected that future obligations can be met only by raising
new capital.
Every financing scheme is vulnerable to the possibility that the Liquidity Constraint
turns out to be less elastic at the time when payments need to be made than was presumed
at the ex ante stage. This follows from imperfect knowledge. However, Minsky
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emphasizes that the degree of instability varies for different forms of financing. Hedge
financing is vulnerable “only” to miscalculations about the amount of actual receipts
coming in at a future date – i.e. to changes in the performance of the firm or the overall
trajectory of economic development. In contrast, speculative and Ponzi financing are also
vulnerable to the more volatile developments of financial markets.80 This is an important
difference to IKE, which (as discussed) does not address the Liquidity Constraint.
While financing strategies are essentially a matter of choice and can be influenced by
appropriate institutional design, the tendency to destabilize is inherent to any financial
system in a capitalist economy. In a system in which hedge financing dominates,
introducing speculative elements, i.e. offering short-term finance at higher interest rates,
can create a competitive advantage.81 This in turn increases the demand for and thus the
value of assets and leads to capital gains. Where capital gains are earned today and are
expected in the future, speculative finance is more readily available as capital gains are
expected to cover any difference between the liabilities and future income. When
economic conditions allow for the repeated rollover of debt, competitive pressures ensure
that more and more units shift to speculative finance. Thus, “profit opportunities within a
robust financial structure make the shift from robustness to fragility an endogenous
phenomenon”.82 The contrast to EMH could not be more clearly stated. Whereas EMH
supposes that markets will approach equilibrium outcomes, the FIH predicts the opposite:
Markets will trend towards instability. Absent proactive intervention this can lead to
major financial and economic crises.
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Once individual units are no longer able to refinance their debt and, as a result,
expectations based on past experience that debt obligations will be met in the future are
no longer validated, the amount of liquidity in the financial system decreases. Banks and
other financial intermediaries will cut back on lending and refinancing as their own
survival constraint forces their hand. A series decline in liquidity triggers a major
downward adjustment of asset prices throughout the economy, which can turn into an
economic recession or depression. Transposed into the conceptual world of IKE this
implies that liquidity shortage triggers swings in asset prices.83
To avoid this outcome, central banks typically offer lender of last resort facilities:
They signal that they stand ready to buy or accept as collateral any assets that are no
longer marketable.84 In essence, the Fed refinances the debt private entities have incurred;
in doing so it provides liquidity to the system. Following Keynes, Minsky argues that this
is precisely what central banks should do.85 Such an intervention, however, does not
come without costs. Not only do taxpayers have to stand in for the losses, the intervention
creates moral hazard problems as market actors begin to rely on future bailouts. Minsky’s
answer to this problem is not to refrain from bailouts. Instead he suggests that the
adequate response is regulatory reforms that address the causes of instability.86
The central bank virtually assures that there will be another crisis in the near
future unless, of course, it outlaws the fragility inducing financial practices.
Clearly, central bank lender-of-last-resort interventions must lead to legislated or
administered changes that favor hedge finance.87
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Mirroring the structure of financial systems at the time of his writing, Minsky devotes
most of his attention to banks, the “central financial organization of a capitalist
economy”.88 This may no longer be accurate in today’s market-based credit system. Still,
Minsky defines banks very broadly: Any entity that creates and markets financial
instruments, not only to those entities, which, because of some legal convention, are
labeled “banks”. The distinction between banks and thrift institutions, different types of
money managers or investment banks, and so forth, can be attributed to historical
accidents. Their codification into a typology of regulated financial entities may stand in
the way of an adaptive response to a changing economic environment.89 The focus of
regulation, therefore, should not be a specific entity, but any moneymaking activities that
may destabilize the system. Minsky details his policy recommendation in the final part of
his book, where he calls for comprehensive reform of institutions that include not only
banks and other financial intermediaries, but the competitive structure of the economy,
the tax system and the corporate sector.90
D.

The Money View of Finance

Minsky’s theory was largely ignored by modern financial economics.91 The primary
reason was that he built on an intellectual tradition that was increasingly regarded as
outmoded; one that drew on central bank practices and learning in the earlier parts of the
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20th century.92 Mehrling himself builds on that very same tradition, which he has labeled
the “money view” to differentiate it from the “finance” and the “economic” view. As
defined by him, the “finance view” focuses on the valuation of assets as is the case for
EMH. The “economic view” focuses on social welfare, in particular on how investments
made by past generations affect the prospects of the present generation. This is the
domain carved out for macroeconomics, which traditionally has been distinct from
finance.93 In contrast, the “money view” focuses on the operation of the complex money
system that links households and firms to brokers and dealers, and these intermediaries to
the entities capable of producing high-powered money – i.e. to the monetary authorities.
(B)oth economics and finance abstract from money; for both of them, money is
just the plumbing behind the walls, taken for granted. Both largely ignore the
sophisticated mechanism that operates to channel cash flows wherever they
emerge, to meet cash commitments wherever they are most pressing. As a
consequence, neither the economics view nor the finance view has been
particularly well suited for understanding the crisis we have just been through, a
crisis during which the crucial monetary plumbing broke down, almost bringing
the rest of the system down with it.94
It follows that to understand the financial crisis the plumbing behind the walls must
be brought into daylight, analyzed, and understood. The basic building blocks of the
money system are shiftability, the central role of dealers, the function of arbitrage, and
the role of a backstopper to the system: A lender or even a dealer of last resort. In the
following each of these elements will be discussed in turn.
Shiftability means the ability to sell on demand an asset for cash to meet one’s
obligations. The ability to shift assets in order to raise cash has been a core feature of the
American banking system long before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System.
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Whereas in England banks would fund their liquidity needs by raising short-term
commercial loans (bills of exchange) that were “self-liquidating”, in the US the highly
volatile agricultural sector created strong seasonal fluctuations in the demand for credit
and the ability to convert claims into cash on demand.95 US banks met that demand for
liquidity primarily by lines of credits with other banks; when that source of liquidity dried
up, they used high quality bonds in their portfolio as collateral for loans, or sold them on
the market.
Such shiftability depended ultimately on security dealers and other speculators
being willing to buy the assets that banks wanted to sell, and so-called speculative
credit was always the lifeblood of the dealer business. Thus, paradoxically, it was
speculative credit, not productive credit, as the source of liquidity for most
American banks in the years before the Fed.96

The framers of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act were well aware of these practices.
According to Mehrling, they recognized and at the same time sought to create outer
bounds for shiftability by declaring that the Fed would only discount commercial loans,
i.e. that only these loans were shiftable to the Fed as the ultimate provider of cash.97 Yet,
the Act did not rule out any of the practices (investing in different asset classes and using
one to make up for shortcomings in another) that facilitated shiftability. The implication
was that assets that were not shiftable to the Fed remained shiftable in private markets.
They were useable in private markets and facilitated the expansion of credits. As
Mehrling put it, “private credit elasticity is always a substitute for public credit
elasticity”. 98 The stock market crash in 1929 laid barren the stark difference between
private and public shiftability. When shiftability in private market ceased, i.e. when
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sellers no longer found buyers for the papers, liquidity dried up, converting a problem of
illiquidity into one of insolvency. Yet, the Fed stuck to the principle of discounting only
commercial loans. It therefore stood on the sidelines as the complex system of privately
provided market liquidity went into reverse, bringing with it an economy-wide
depression.99
Dealers, the second institutional pillar in contemporary financial markets according to
the MVF, are an indispensable feature for shiftability. Unlike brokers, dealers take assets
and the credit risk associated with them onto their own books. For this service they
charge a premium, and they make profits on the difference between this premium and the
discount rate the Fed will charge them should they need to shift assets to the Fed for
liquidity purposes. The framers of the original Federal Reserve Act believed that the
system would be self-enforcing: By clearly drawing a line between shiftable and nonshiftable assets, it was hoped that the law would induce market participants to internalize
the costs of non-shiftability at the upper end of the chain. Yet, the profit opportunities
associated with shiftability proved too tempting.100 To see this, consider how a dealers
market operates.
A dealer takes assets on her own book. She quotes bid and ask spreads to others with
a view of balancing her own risk and profitability. She finances the positions in these
assets by raising funds in another market, in our own days typically the repurchase or
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Repo market,101 using the assets as collateral. By carefully managing the term structure
arbitrage of her portfolio, the dealer can make a profit. As long as the dealer has access to
the repo market, to bank loans as a kind of lender of last resort for dealers,102 or to the
Fed, the risk inherent in dealership can be mitigated. If and when these sources of
liquidity dry up, the system unravels. To fully appreciate the critical role of dealers in a
world with the Liquidity Constraint, it is useful to contrast it with a hypothetical world
without it. This is how Mehrling describes such a world:
Then, so long as the expected profit on the term structure was positive, dealers
would have an incentive to increase leverage, buying bonds and selling bills.
Competition among dealers would drive expected profit on the term structure
arbitrage to zero, and the expectations hypothesis would come into its own. (…)
[I]t is a world in which there is no survival constraint, hence no liquidity risk,
hence no liquidity premium in asset prices. It is a world without dealers.103
This is not the world we live in. Nor can such a world be explained in terms of
informational asymmetries; that may work for brokers who are pure intermediaries, but
not for dealers who take the risk of the underlying asset, including the liquidity risk, onto
their own balance sheet. The Fed, in turn, lubricates the private dealer system by
participating directly in the repo market for Treasuries. 104 Since dealers and other market
participants use Treasuries as collateral, these interventions directly affect liquidity, and
hence prices, in other asset markets as well.

101

The repo, or repurchase market, is a bankers’ market for short-term loans in which they sell assets and
repurchase them within hours or days. It is similar to a collateralized loan, but differs in that the title to the
asset formally changes hand, only to be transferred back at the end of the loan period. See Mehrling
(2011a), supra note 12 at 34. There are no interest rates, but the sale and buy prices are adjusted to
accomplish the same economic result. The beauty of a repo from the point of view of regulatory arbitrage is
that it is not classified as a loan and thus is not subject to reserve or capital requirements.
102
Ibid at 103.
103
Ibid at 100-101.
104
Mehrling (2011a), supra note 12 at 99.

32

Two things follow. First, money and capital markets are deeply intertwined; 105
primary dealers with direct access to the Fed are critical links in this system. And second,
according to the money view of finance (MVF), liquidity is a critical determined of asset
prices.106
Shiftability can be enhanced by creating new tradable assets. This is the essence of
financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage. Recall Samuelson’s famous dictum that
efficient capital markets are characterized by “no arbitrage”.107 In contrast, MVF can be
interpreted to suggest that in a world governed by the Liquidity Constraint arbitrage is a
defining feature, and the major purpose of financial innovation is to create new arbitrage
opportunities in order to enhance liquidity elasticity.
Take the example of the currency swap. It was designed to circumvent capital
controls under the Bretton Woods system. The currency swap allowed firms to gain
access to foreign capital by swapping loan obligations in different currencies so that
technically no capital crossed borders. 108 It is only a step from here for a bank with
branches in both countries to offer firms from these markets a dealer service for a fee by
accepting the default risk of either party in the transaction. Further, the bank may want to
hedge its risk by entering into a forward market with yet another bank. The only reason

105

The interdependence of money and capital markets has deep historical roots. In order to meet higher
demand for credit during agricultural sowing periods, banks would build reserves during low demand
periods and send excess reserves to New York where they provided cheap funds for stock market
speculation. “The result was a regular seasonality in interest rates, punctuated by regular financial crises in
1873, 1884, 1893, and finally 1907.” Ibid at 32.
106
In contrast, Frydman and Goldberg argue that asset price swing determine the availability of capital to
finance it. “The financial markets provide assessments of the relative prospects of companies’ assets. (...)
Markets allocate capital based on these price signals: the higher the price of a company’s asset, the easier it
is for it to attract financial capital, whereas lower prices make financing more difficult.” Frydman and
Goldberg (2011), supra note 11 at 149.
107
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
108
The simplest way to achieve this outcome is for two companies in two different countries to create
subsidiaries in the other country and for one parent to loan domestic currency to the subsidiary of the other
parent. For a more elaborated discussion of this scenario, see Mehrling (2011a), supra note 12 at 72-75.

33

this other bank will be willing to engage in such a transaction is that it expects to make a
profit, which it does if and when “the forward exchange rate is greater than the realized
spot exchange rate”.109 Modern finance theory holds that it should not be possible to
make money on these transactions, because under equilibrium conditions the return from
two different investment strategies should be identical.110 Yet, in reality counterparties in
swap transactions do make money because they carry “the risk involved in absorbing
mismatch in the currency swap market”. 111 This is essentially a liquidity risk, which
markets price, but which modern finance theory simply ignores.
The currency swap is only one in a whole series of financial innovations for the
purpose of regulatory arbitrage. Another example is Regulation Q, which stipulated an
interest rate ceiling savings and loans associations could pay on their deposit liabilities.112
The strategy around this restriction was to design a new financial vehicle to which this
restriction would not apply and to make money by attracting more deposits. According to
Mehrling, this was “the origin of the money market mutual fund”.113 Another important
invention has been the credit default swap, which allows the separation of interest rate
risk, default risk, and the risk of devaluation of the underlying asset. Specifically, the
issuer of CDS assumes the default risk and makes a profit from the differential between
the insurance premium he charges and the expected costs for delivering cash or risk-free
assets in the event of default. These deals are structured as implicit rather than explicit
loans to avoid triggering reserve and capital adequacy rules.
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As such, swaps provided a neutral way to get around regulations designed for
traditional bank balance sheets, regulations that typically scaled both required
reserves and required capital to the size of the balance sheet. Here is the origin for
the so-called shadow banking system.114
The most important source of stability for a financial system built on shiftability and
dealers is the availability of a lender or even dealer of last resort, i.e. an agent willing and
able to offer cash for assets that are no longer shiftable in private markets. Because it is
the ultimate guarantor of liquidity, the LLR sits at the core of a system of interdependent
financial claims. “[I]n effect, the central bank realizes the survival constraint by
providing current cash flow to allow borrowers to delay the day of reckoning”.115 Prior to
the global crisis, the Fed had developed the practice to “always lends freely”, but “only to
primary security dealers, only against Treasury security collateral, and only at the
Treasury repo rate that corresponds to the target Fed Funds rate”.116 The hope that by
limiting shiftability to the Fed markets would internalize the risks they took by creating
private sources of shiftability proved to be mistaken yet again. In the aftermath of the fall
of Lehman Brothers private credit contraction was sufficiently severe for the Fed to
expand the range of parties it was willing to lend to and the type of collateral it was
willing to accept and put on its own balance sheet.
The result was, first, a hollowing out of the Fed’s balance sheet as it sold off its
Treasury securities (to the former lenders) to fund new loans (to the former
borrowers), and an explosion of the Fed’s balance sheet as it expanded its deposit
liabilities (to the former lenders), and used the proceeds to fund additional lending
(to the former borrowers).117
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The Fed adapted its response to the crisis to the market structure that had evolved
under its stewardship. In the new world of a capital-market-based credit system,118 where
even commercial banks have morphed from lenders into dealers, the central bank itself
became a Dealer of Last Resort (DLR).
In effect, the Bagehot principle can be understood as recommending that the
central bank post a wide bid-ask spread in the money market and use its balance
sheet to absorb the resulting flow of orders. This is more or less exactly what the
Fed did in the various emergency liquidity facilities that it opened in response to
the crisis.119

This outcome was far from inevitable. Rather, Mehrling attributes it to the thinking of
monetary policy makers in the years leading up to the global crisis. Specifically, the
dominance of EMH in financial economics and the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model in macroeconomics furthered policies aimed at producing the
very equilibrium outcomes theoretical models predicted, but markets were not producing
on their own.
Monetary policy came to be seen as a matter of making liquidity in the real world
the free good that it was in ideal theory. The result was a systematic bias toward
ease by the monetary authorities, systematic bias that private speculators were
only too happy to exploit for private profit. In effect, the monetary authorities
became partners with the private speculators in a quixotic drive to make EH as
true in reality as it was in theory.120

This intellectual framework ensured that policy makers ignored asset prices. After
all, markets were believed to set the “natural” interest rate plus some expected inflation.
Price stability, not financial stability, was the overriding concern, and for that the index
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of consumer prices was deemed sufficient.121 According to Mehrling, this policy stand
has proved disastrous: “[I]f the Fed fails to raise interest rates in the face of a creditfueled asset price bubble, the bubble will feed on itself, growing ever larger and having
ever greater distorting effects, until it bursts”.122 To see why, recall how the dealer system
operates. The cheaper it is to fund liquidity for dealers with access to the Fed lending
facilities, the greater their incentives to leverage themselves and offer cheap market
liquidity to private borrowers. This is the mechanism through which low (Fed) funding
rates translate into high asset prices. The effects were (predictably from MVF)
particularly pronounced for fairly illiquid assets not supported by a two-way dealer
system, such as home loans.
To summarize, MVF can be described as a further development of Minsky’s FIH
and its adaptation to 21st century finance. Banks are no longer the central agents in
finance, markets are; in this new market-based credit system dealers take center stage as
liquidity providers. Having allowed this system to evolve to the breaking point, the Fed
had no option but to evolve from (only) a lender into a dealer of last resort. In short,
Mehrling attributes the crisis in large parts to governance failures and these failures to an
intellectual climate that favored the finance view over an institutionally founded money
view of the financial system.
III.

Financial Theories and Regulatory Implications

How we think about financial markets determines how we regulate them. It should
therefore not be surprising that the different theories lead to different regulatory
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strategies. Table 1 below summarizes how the four theories introduced above depict
financial markets and the regulatory implications they draw.

Table 1: Comparing Theories and their Regulatory Implications
Function of
financial
markets
Pricing in
financial
markets

Regulatory
Implications

A.

(R)EMH
Resource
allocation

EMH: Pricing of
intrinsic value;
REMH
information costs
implies relative,
not absolute
efficiency
Improve (relative)
information
efficiency

IKE
Resource
allocation under
conditions of
uncertainty
Pricing under
conditions of
uncertainty can
create extreme
asset price
swings
Guidance range
and excess
dampening to
prevent extreme
asset price
swings

FIH
Resource allocation
under conditions of
uncertainty and
illiquidity
Pricing integrated
with the financing
of outputs,
positions in capital
assets, and the
validating of
existing liabilities
Reform economic
institutions to
promote hedge
financing

MVF
Management of
illiquidity risk in
interconnected dealer
market
Pricing influenced by
liquidity; expansion
and/or shift in liquidity
creates asset price
booms; reversals in
liquidity trigger collapse
of asset prices
Manage system-wide
money supply by
monitoring asset prices

Comparing Financial Theories

The different conceptions of financial markets are reflected in the function they are
deemed to serve (Row 1). EMH and IKE see the primary purpose of financial markets in
the allocation of scarce resources to productive use. However, IKE points out that
resource allocation may be suboptimal because it takes place under conditions of
imperfect knowledge. FIH agrees, but pushes the argument a step further: Pricing in
financial markets is determined not only by uncertainty or imperfections in our ability to
forecast the future, but also by the Liquidity Constraint. Because it is impossibility to
convert all claims into cash at any given moment, markets operate under the Damocles
Sword of a reversal in liquidity. MVF shares this position. Examining the complex
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market-based credit system that characterizes finance today, it suggests that liquidity
drives both upswings and downturns in asset prices: When extra liquidity becomes
available because liquidity is shifted from one market to another or a new class of
tradable assets is created, asset prices go up. When liquidity dries up, financial
intermediaries can be forced to conduct a fire sale of assets to meet their own obligations,
thereby triggering a collapse in prices. 123 In a world of highly interconnected two-way
dealer markets, the main function of financial markets is the for-profit management of
liquidity.
It follows that the four theories have different perspectives on how financial assets are
priced and how the pricing affects the market’s stability. For EMH the pricing
mechanism is at the heart of its efficiency postulate. In its strong form, EMH postulates
that prices incorporate all relevant information and thus lead to the efficient allocation of
resources – a state where no transaction is possible that would make one party better off
without making another party worse off. When information is not costless, a fully
efficient outcome cannot be achieved; nonetheless, by managing information costs,
relative efficiency is deemed achievable.124
According to IKE prices that are created in this fashion can experience abrupt swings
with dire consequences for the financial markets and the economy as a whole. The reason
is that investment decisions are not only impeded by information costs; they are affected
by fundamental uncertainty about what the future holds. This implies that corrections in
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asset prices may become necessary. This is why markets are inherently instable; and the
larger the correction the more dire the consequences.
FIH and MVF agree that changes in the future are likely, but these changes are not
triggered by updates to our knowledge alone. Instead, they are directly linked to the
availability of liquidity. Minsky argues that the pricing mechanism in financial markets is
fundamentally different from the pricing mechanism for ordinary goods. 125 It is
determined not simply by the demand and supply for that good, but also by the
availability of liquidity. If positions in capital assets can be easily refinanced today,
financing for new investments is more easily available than if past claims become
invalidated by a history of default. As Mehrling points out, in a world of market-based
credit systems based on the constant shiftability of assets, liquidity becomes a primary
driver of asset prices. Every entity in this system is constantly seeking to balance its own
balance sheet, taking positions often financed with debt, thus relying on funding liquidity,
and liquidating others to generate instant cash, taking advantage of market liquidity under
the threat of its own survival: The ability to meet obligations as they become due. As
long as there are enough takers for existing assets they can be converted into cash upon
demand. If that is no longer feasible, markets and prices collapse.
On the way up, ample funding liquidity in private money markets supported the
extension of market liquidity into previously unchartered territory, and that
extension supported collateral valuations that supported further extension of
funding liquidity. On the way down, the same reinforcing cycle worked in
reverse. This is the inherent instability of credit, twenty-first century edition.126
The regulatory implications follow directly from these theories. For EMH and its
close cousin, REMH, it is all about information costs; for IKE it is managing the
125
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imperfect knowledge constraint.

In

contrast, Minsky advocates

a wholesale

transformation of economic institutions to more stable financial structures, and correcting
deviations from them, which are to be expected given the inherent drive of markets
towards instability. Mehrling takes a less radical view on regulation. He does not
advocate comprehensive institutional reforms, but governance mechanisms that are
attuned to the Liquidity Constraint.
B.

Towards a New Approach to Financial Regulation

The regulatory strategies that follow from REMH are straightforward and sufficiently
familiar so that they will not be further elaborated here. 127 The critical issue is
information costs and a fear that over-regulation might foreclose arbitrage opportunities
and other strategies market actors use to deal with informational frictions. In contrast,
from the perspective of FIH, the event of a crisis suggests the need for far-reaching
institutional reforms that should encompass not only the financial system, but the entire
economic system.128 Finance and the economy at large are viewed as deeply intertwined.
They therefore need to be reformed in tandem to ensure that a more stable system
emerges in the aftermath of a crisis. Such a far-reaching reform agenda has rarely been
realized as the political obstacles are significant. A partial exception is the New Deal in
the US – although Minsky criticizes even these reforms as being beholden mostly to pre-
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Keynesian thinking and insufficiently attuned to the inherent instability of finance.129 As
Minsky himself realized, an important reason for the lack of impetus for comprehensive
reforms that might render a more stable system is the role the central bank has come to
play during crises. Its interventions mitigate the effects of the crisis, thereby undermining
the political resolve for the kind of corrections that would be needed to stabilize the
unstable economy. The legislative answer to the financial crisis in the US, the DoddFrank Act, confirms this. It seeks to offer greater protection for consumers and introduces
macro-prudential risk management, but leaves the financial and economic system as it
existed prior to the crisis largely intact.130
Approaches to regulation that move beyond EMH, yet do not call for the
comprehensive institutional overhaul Minsky proposed, can be found in the two
remaining theories, IKE and MVF. The subsequent analysis will focus on them rather
than FIH for two reasons to explore whether there is a middle ground between
overhauling the structure of our financial and economic system on one hand, and
pretending that except for some information problems all is well in the world of finance.
IKE and MVF both suggest that effective governance of financial markets requires
substantially more than reducing information costs. They require proactive regulatory
strategies to prevent crises. Both theories view modern economies and financial systems
as highly dynamic and suggest that markets rapidly adapt to new regulation. As a result,
predetermined static modes of regulation will by outdated soon after being enacted. Both
129
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theories therefore call for governance regimes that give substantial discretion to
regulators. This raises important questions about who governs these governors. 131 We
will return to this question infra under 3. First, we need to clarify the regulatory
implications that follow from IKE and MVF respectively, and where and why they might
differ from one another. To do so, the following two subsections pitch the two theories
against one another. IKEs’ approach to regulation is summarized first, but interspersed
with reactions that follow from the logic of MVF. Roles are switched in subsection 2 and
MVF takes the lead as IKE responds.
1.

IKE’s Regulatory Approach

For IKE, the major objective of regulation is to address the problem of instability that
results from imperfect knowledge and nonroutine change. Frydman and Goldberg do not
believe that government agents are better equipped at making allocative decisions than
markets. Nor do they think that they have superior information or knowledge. They
certainly do not suggest that government agents should substitute for markets. Instead,
the purpose of regulation is to manage an inherently instable system, which because of
this inherent instability should not be presumed to allocate resources well.132 This should
be done by way of “guidance range” and/or “excess dampening” measures.133
Guidance range is meant to signal to the market that it has well exceeded historical
benchmarks in asset price movements. While the computation of these benchmarks is
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contestable, the use of data offers some check on the discretion of regulators. 134
Policymakers should monitor asset price development and announce publicly and with
reasons given when the market overshoots significantly.135 The primary purpose of this
announcement is not to add additional information: According to Frydman and Goldberg,
most market participants today are well-informed and will realize when price swings
have reached extremes.136 Instead it “may help coordinate their [i.e. market participants’]
views around official assessments in much the same way that the inflation targets set by
central banks do for inflation expectations”.137
From the perspective of MVF these measures are useful in that they ensure that
regulators will actually monitor asset prices. However, they are likely to be insufficient.
As long as liquidity remains highly elastic, i.e. as long as market participants find dealers
willing to shift their assets for a reasonable liquidity premium, they will continue to bid
up asset prices irrespective of any guidance range announcements. Moreover, those with
access to liquidity even after an asset price swing has occurred – specifically, those with
direct access to the Fed funding facilities or to investors with big pockets, like Sovereign
Wealth Funds or Warren Buffet – are less likely to respond to such guidance range
because they operate under a different survival constraint. Yet, they are the ones with
potentially the biggest impact on asset prices.
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In fact, from the MVF perspective guidance range may be the least effective where it
is most needed. Excess liquidity tends to have the least impact on highly liquid markets
and the most on those that are illiquid.138 During boom times new credit facilities and
rising asset prices attract dealers to new markets. By offering two-way dealer services
they foster greater liquidity of assets that have hitherto been largely illiquid. An example
is the market for securitized mortgages to finance housing. When liquidity dries up and
the bubble bursts these markets are often the first markets to fail.139 Critically, these new
markets may be too young to offer long-term historical data for purposes of guidance
range.
In addition to guidance range, IKE proposes a more proactive governance strategy,
namely the dampening of excessive price swings. This suggests that Frydman and
Goldberg are well aware that guidance range alone might be insufficient. A specific
policy recommendation associated with excess dampening is counter-cyclical capital
requirements. They recommend that these measures should be stratified to ensure that
financial intermediaries with strong exposure to particular markets, such as housing, are
required to take additional safeguards.140
MVF does not oppose capital requirements, but from its perspective one would
caution against relying on them too heavily. First, they guard primarily against default,
138
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not illiquidity;141 and while illiquidity may lead to default, it need not do so, at least not if
short-term illiquidity problems can be effectively addressed. Moreover, past experience
suggests that their efficacy is often undermined by regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, the
evolution of financial markets and the pace of financial innovation suggests that attempts
to constrain credit growth by imposing capital or reserve requirements can push market
participants to find ways to formally comply while making sure that their disposable
assets are in fact not much curtailed. Swaps, CDS and other instruments have been used
for these purposes; indeed some have suggested that the primary function of CDS has
been regulatory arbitrage. 142 One implication is that capital adequacy rules may have
been ineffective; even more problematic, additional sources of liquidity risk were created
in response to capital adequacy requirements. Critically, these risks remained largely
unrecognized by financial intermediaries and regulators alike.
Monetary policy is another policy tool that could be used as an excess-dampening
measure.143 One such tool is interest rates, but Frydman and Goldberg caution that they
may be effective in influencing asset prices only in the short term. More tribute is given
to the Fed’s innovative quantitative easing policies during the crisis, which, according to
Frydman and Goldberg, affected interest rates more directly and with longer lasting
effect.144 For Mehrling, the interventions by the Fed are not so much about interest rates.
Indeed, he questions whether interest rates are the mechanism by which monetary
policies affect asset prices:
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Monetary policy works, in the first instance, by affecting the behavior of dealers
not banks, and by pushing around asset prices not bank lending. Maybe eventually
the lending mechanism kicks in, but on a time scale much longer than the daily
survival constraint that is at the center of a money view perspective.145
Instead, he argues that when the Fed eases funding conditions it directly affects the
behavior of primary dealers. They will change the prices they quote on Treasury bills and
bonds to manage their own order flows. In doing so they affect others in the system, who
in turn will adapt their price quotes. The dealer system transmits changes in liquidity at
the top throughout the system. As a result, the prices of “corporate bonds, mortgagebacked securities, even foreign securities146 are directly affected by the Fed’s intervention
in the Treasury market. In a similar vein, MVF views the innovative interventions by the
Fed during the crisis not so much as measures to affect long-term interest rates, but as
actions of a dealer – the dealer of last resort.147 By effectively insuring assets that were no
longer sellable in the market the Fed supported the price of other assets that also
depended on liquidity.148
In addition to guidance range and excess dampening, IKE offers a new take on rating
agencies. Much attention has been paid to the possibility that collusion between rating
agencies and banks whose products (such as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs)
they assess may bias the rating.149 While such collusion cannot be ruled out entirely, IKE
suggests an alternative explanation for why rating agencies have been so frequently so far
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off the mark.150 Given the pervasiveness of imperfect knowledge and nonroutine change,
rating agencies too are affected. Their ratings are based on assumptions that are informed
by current knowledge, which, as we have seen, may turn out to be wrong in light of
actual developments. To ensure that investors don’t blindly follow ratings but are
reminded of their inherent imperfection, Frydman and Goldberg argue that they should
not only disclose their assumptions, but offer at least two sets of ratings: One that is
based on one set of assumptions, and another based on modified assumptions.151 This
would enable individual traders to assess which of the ratings is closer to their own
perception of the world. It would thus play a similar coordinative role as the guidance
range announcements of the central bank discussed above.
Rating agencies do not feature prominently in MVF. The theory is about the
plumbing of the financial system, the ebbs and flows of liquidity and the central role of
dealers at the chutes of the system. A possible shortcoming is that this underestimates
how factors other than the supply of credit might affect liquidity. An argument could be
made that credit rating agencies contributed to making liquidity more elastic by
furthering the appearance that assets, such as securitized mortgages or CDOs, were safe
for investment. This allowed pension funds and other investors to acquire such assets and
enhanced their shiftability.
Where rating agencies enter MVF, at least indirectly, is where most of the action
takes place according to this theory, namely on the balance sheet of financial
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intermediaries. Mehrling points out that both the shadow banking system and the
investment bank dealer system “were net buyers of AAA protection” 152 for the upper
tranches of CDOs in their portfolio. This implies that rating agencies had a role in
designating the tranches these agents were selling or holding. Yet, for MVF the critical
question is not the rating as such, but the counterparty question. Since assets on the
balance sheet of one party must find a mirror image on the liability side of another, the
critical question becomes, if most players in the financial system were buying protection
for AAA tranches, who was selling?153
As it turned out, these were traditional bond insurers, such as MBIA, Ambac and the
Financial Products Division of AIG. Their own risk models suggested that the probability
of default for AAA rated papers was extremely unlikely and that, therefore, they could
charge an insurance premium essentially for nothing. The problem in this calculation was
not primarily that they miscalculated risk (although they did that too), but that they
misunderstood their role and that of CDS in the financial system.
And yet, their willingness to provide AAA protection was completely essential to
the system; without it, dealers would not have been able to square up their CDS
books and, hence, would not have been able to provide the market liquidity on
which the entire system depended. The insurers were getting money for
something, but without realizing what that something was.154

In essence, they were insuring for liquidity, whereas their models had only
contemplated default. This misconception is arguably not addressed by IKE’s proposal to
require rating agencies to issue several ratings based on different assumptions. A possible
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strategy to reconcile the two views would be to require rating agencies to rate not only
default, but also liquidity risk.
2.

MVF’s Regulatory Approach

MVF’s approach to regulation is still in the early stages of development and not as
specific as that of IKE. Still, several principles of regulation emerge from this theory.
MVF eschews the distinction between finance and money as well as between micro and
macro that is so deeply engrained in conventional thinking about the financial system.
For MVF they are not separable, neither in good nor in bad times. They belong to the
same plumbing system and feed directly into each other. This is why the Fed’s monetarist
policy, which calibrated money supply to reflect an ideal demand for liquidity, had such
far-reaching and ultimately disastrous consequences for the financial system. According
to Mehrling, Monetary Walrasianism motivated the Fed to supply “liquidity as a free
good” in the hope that this would induce markets to approximate equilibrium
outcomes.155 At the same time as the Fed focused on controlling the money supply, it
gave private markets free range in the supply of credit without acknowledging the
interdependence between the two. “Thus, the natural thrust toward fragility was
amplified, not dampened, by the operations of the financial authority”.156
According to MVF, any attempt to reform the governance of finance must therefore
start with the Fed. The crisis has forced it into the role of DLR and future reforms must
start from here. “We are not going to start from scratch, so our reforms had better engage
with the system as it is, not as it was or as we might wish it to be in some ideal world”.157

155

Mehrling (2011a), supra note 12 at 65.
Ibid at 70.
157
Ibid at 113.
156

50

Yet, to adequately respond to the system as it has evolved, a profound retooling of the
Fed’s conceptual framework is required to avoid embarking on another “quixotic”
venture that will contribute to rather than prevent the destabilization of financial
markets. 158 Specifically, according to MVF, the Fed should continuously monitor all
asset prices and tailor its policies and direct market interventions to the dynamics of
liquidity these data reflect. The need to monitor all asset prices follows from the fact that
it is impossible to determine ex ante when and for which asset classes a liquidity crunch
will occur. 159 This can be interpreted as a nod towards IKE, but with emphasis on
monitoring liquidity.
Moreover, the Fed should oversee both funding and market liquidity. 160 Funding
liquidity refers to the ability of private dealers to “borrow in the money market in order to
finance their market-making operations in capital markets”.161 The monitoring of funding
liquidity should extend to Repo as well as Eurodollar markets, because the Fed is the de
facto dealer of last resort for these markets. The need to monitor market liquidity follows
from the recognition during the crisis that interventions aimed at guaranteeing funding
liquidity on its own did not ensure market liquidity.162 In the diagnosis provided by MVF,
private dealers translate funding liquidity in money markets into market liquidity by
borrowing in money markets to finance their positions. Effective monitoring must keep
an eye on both sides of this equation – funding liquidity and market liquidity.163
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MVF does not suggest that the Fed should substitute for private actors – except in
extreme cases, as in wartime or major financial crises. Specifically, even though money
markets and capital markets may be intertwined, the Fed should not set the price for
capital market products. Instead, it should set a floor for them, “which in normal times
should be some distance away from the market price”.164 Neither is it the role of the Fed
to eliminate the risk dealers face. The most important function the Fed should perform is
to signal to markets that – contrary to the Fed’s past policies – liquidity is not a free good.
This would help “establish an arena within which private calculation of expected profit
and risk makes sense”.165
From the vantage point of IKE, these recommendations are not much different from
“guidance range” or “excess dampening”. The price floor for securities could be
characterized as MVF’s version of IKE’s guidance range; and the establishment of
“bounds” for market participants within which they make their decisions about how to
allocate resources is MVF’s version of “excess dampening”. Note, however, that the
purpose of the monitoring and governance efforts differs in the two accounts. Whereas
IKE is concerned with managing imperfect knowledge, MVF regards liquidity as the
overriding policy concern. IKE therefore places much (though not exclusive) emphasis
on incentives to push away from the brink, whereas MVF stresses the need to directly
affect the hydraulics of the money system, i.e. the ups and downs of liquidity.
Nonetheless, the similarities between the two approaches suggest that the same regulatory
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regime might serve both goals. Moreover, as the previous discussion has suggested, the
two approaches are not mutually exclusive. It may therefore be useful to pursue both.

C.

Reforming Governance vs. Reforming Finance

This section explores in greater detail what impact the insights derived from IKE and
MVF would have for the governance of finance. We lump the two accounts together in
this final analysis, because there is sufficient overlap in the regulatory implications
between them. As the constructed dialogue between IKE and MVF in the previous
section suggests, the proponents of both IKE and MVF maintain that regulating the
financial systems they describe is feasible and both put a lot of weight on the central bank
as the chief regulator. Neither, however, offers a full blown account of how an effective
regulatory regime would look like that would be true to the challenges they describe
while also being compatible with basic principles of self-ordering in democratic polities.
Governing an unstable financial system under conditions of imperfect knowledge and
illiquidity raises difficult questions about the proper design of governance regimes.166
The major objective for such a regime would have to be to guard against financial
instability while promoting innovation and financial expansion. This would be a
significant departure from the current regulatory paradigm, which emphasizes the
market’s inherent move towards equilibrium and associates virtually any innovation in
financial markets as well as market expansion with efficiency. Such a new regulatory
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paradigm would also require regulators to be more responsive to an ever-changing
environment. It would require them to have the wherewithal to spot these changes and
grant them sufficient flexibility to respond to new challenges as they arise. In short, it
would require a highly competent, independent, and yet socially responsible superregulator.
1.

Responsiveness

IKE and MVF both emphasize the need for regulatory flexibility and discretion. In a
world of imperfect knowledge neither market participants nor regulators know what the
future will hold. It therefore makes little sense for lawmakers or regulators to devise
highly specified rules to incentivize market actors so that they might achieve optimal
outcomes. In that sense, both laws and regulations are incomplete. 167 Regulators may
have somewhat greater flexibility in redesigning and adapting rules over time than do
legislatures because regulatory change does not require the same broad political support
as does legislation. Nonetheless, a regulatory philosophy that seeks to optimize rules ex
ante will always lag behind market development.168 Not only will it be ineffective should
circumstances change; it also offers a convenient focal point for regulatory arbitrage. The
more specific a regulatory regime, the more attractive it becomes for regulatory arbitrage
and the less equipped it is to respond to such market behavior.169
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Similarly, from the perspective of MVF it is difficult to determine ex ante where and
when liquidity problems will occur in the future. In competitive financial markets entities
are bound to search for or develop new asset classes that can be held or traded for profit.
Illiquid assets can be made more liquid by attracting two-way dealers that offer liquidity
risk management services, and new financial assets can be derived from others. This
makes it difficult to foresee which asset class will be targeted in the future and which
entities will serve as dealers or offer insurance services. Mehrling therefore argues that
regulators should monitor “all” assets 170 -- a tall order given the pace and scope of
innovation in today’s financial market place.
Taking Imperfect Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraint seriously implies the need
to move from a regulatory framework that emphasizes rule optimization to one that
focuses on processes for managing markets as they evolve, i.e. to monitor them, adapt
existing strategies, and devise and implement new regulatory measures as need be to
ensure that the market is stabilized before it reaches another pivot point. 171 But who
should exercise such power? Is it possible for a single actor to monitor all assets
effectively? How much discretion should it have to intervene and what tools of regulation
should be at its disposal?
Both theories place the central bank, in the US the Fed, at the center of attention. It
occupies the core of the financial system172 because it is the only entity with unlimited
access to high-powered money. According to Mehrling, the existence of a liquidity
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provider of last resort makes the money system inherently hierarchical. It seems only
natural to endow the Fed with the regulatory tools to make the most of its position.173 In
IKE’s account, the Fed also plays a critical role. It sets interest rates and engages in
quantitative easing. And, although not specified as the agency that should adopt guidance
range announcements, it would be a natural candidate for this role.
2.

Who Governs the Governor(s)?

The empowerment of the central bank as the primary governance agent for financial
markets raises fundamental questions of accountability and democratic governance. The
Central Bank gets to decide in a looming crisis when and where to intervene, to select
whom to lend to or what assets to accept as dealer of last resort. In essence, in extreme
situations it decides over the life and death of individual entities and the system as a
whole. That is a lot of discretion.174 Even if experts on central banks assure us that central
bankers are professionals and devoted to doing the right thing, 175 some accountability
will be needed not only to guard against the temptation of abuse, but to ensure that there
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is some level of political responsibility if Central Bank actions fail to achieve the desired
outcomes or have adverse effects.
One approach might be to require more public justification for Central Bank actions.
IKE suggests that regulatory interventions, such as guidance range announcements, shall
be reasoned and that the analysis that motivates the intervention is disclosed.176 This is an
important step in the right direction – provided the political system works effectively –
but it may not be sufficient. The Central Bank will, of course, always justify its
interventions by arguing that they were necessary to save “the system” from collapse.
Putting aside concerns about bias or capture of such a powerful regulator, that
justification sounds hollow: There will always be a range of options to choose from. The
act of choosing when associated with the allocation of costs and benefits that these
choices entail makes this in essence a political decision.177 At least in democracies such
decisions should be ultimately accountable to the electorate – unless in finance we face
“the fateful choice between effectiveness and fidelity to the principle of self-rule”.178 If
only a central bank can save the financial system from collapse, one might argue, then
perhaps it should be given all necessary powers to do so. 179 But this will not come
without costs. The problem of delegating this much power to a central agent is
compounded by the fact that traditional means for holding agencies accountable, such as
176
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predetermining the objectives if not the means of regulation are unlikely to work. This
approach presumes that the objectives of the regime can be determined ex ante and that,
therefore, governing is primarily about implementing these objectives, not their
articulation. Yet, in a rapidly changing world these objectives are unknown and the lines
between goal determination and implementation are blurring.180
Furthermore, some theorists have suggested that empowering a single agent at the
core of the system may be counter-productive under conditions of uncertainty.
Comparing the pros and cons of different forms of organization, Qian et al. suggest that
the traditional hierarchical U-Form of firm organization works best when outcomes are
known ex ante. If, however, outcomes are unknown, unpredictable, or if a firm seeks to
discover new products or markets, the more flexible multi-functional M-Form is superior,
as it encourages experimentation and cross-divisional learning.181 The equivalent of this
approach in terms of regulatory architecture would be to have multiple regulatory
agencies that coordinate horizontally with each other, not only through a central
authority. This would give every regulator the requisite flexibility to respond to events as
they emerge and facilitate communication and responsiveness of multiple agencies.
This is, of course, not the way most regulatory agencies are structured today. Most
are independent from direct political interference and autonomous from one another, and
they carefully guard their turf. In some countries they have been integrated into a single
regulator, but that has re-enforced hierarchy not a coordinated, flexible response
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systems.182 The reforms that were introduced following the financial crisis also bear the
hallmark of hierarchy, not horizontal coordination. The US still stands out in international
comparison as a regulatory regime with many, perhaps too many, regulatory agencies.
Still, the trend even here has been to centralize monitoring and regulation. Specifically,
the Dodd-Frank Act 183 established the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC),
which comprises of the Fed, the Treasury and other key regulators.184 The FSOC shall
“identify risks to the financial stability of the United States”, “promote market
discipline”, and “respond to emergency threats”. 185 It must rely on other regulatory
agencies to perform this task, but the point is that all critical information shall be
channeled through FSOC and that it has ultimate authority for determining when it is
time to act and how.
This centralized approach is not inconsistent with IKE’s or MVF’s approaches to
regulation. But these theories may well be underestimating the ability of a central agent
to collect and process all relevant information. They also must find answers to the
challenge coming from organizational theories that under conditions of uncertainty
hierarchy may not be a suitable governance solution. This raises the question, whether
there are viable alternatives, specifically solutions that encourage decentralized and
discretionary law enforcement, yet are compatible with democratic oversight.
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A possible solution may come from the literature on “New” or “Experimental
Governance”.186 It holds that multi-level governance structures without a firm command
center and clearly defined lines of control are feasible, in fact hat they encourage
stakeholder participation in the making and enforcement of governance regimes. 187
Critically, however, experimental governance presumes the willingness of all
stakeholders to cooperate in the search for new governance solutions. This requires that
they recognize that the objectives and means of governance are not known to any of
them. It also assumes that stakeholders have a mutual interest in finding workable
solutions, which is a prerequisite for their willingness to deliberate and experiment in the
search for solutions.188
Unfortunately, the world of finance is not a place where awareness of one’s own
limitations or worldviews is very pronounced. Rather, it is characterized by groupthink
and by intellectual silos that are reinforced by organizational practices.189 Few market
participants, officials at the Fed or the Treasury, ar academics in the relevant fields saw
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the crisis coming; 190 those who did were derided for their deviation from the shared
exuberance about a new dawn in the management of financial risk.191 Moreover, attempts
to incorporate modes of experimental governance into financial regulation have failed
spectacularly in the global crisis, at least in part because both regulators and the regulated
were caught in the same belief system. 192 Basel II, the revised Basel Accord to
standardize financial regulation internationally, was lauded for incorporating such
innovative practices in the regulation of banks.193 It allowed banks to opt out of rigid
capital requirements established by Basel I,194 provided they could demonstrate to their
regulators that they have in place effective internal risk management models and systems
for their review. Famously, Northern Rock – the first English bank to experience a classic
bank run since 1866 – received approval from the UK Financial Services Authority under
Basel II to use its own internal risk assessment model only weeks before the bank
collapsed.195 As Simon suggests, the risk management models banks used and regulators
approved
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were impaired by misunderstandings shared by both banks and regulators,
including the assumptions that returns would be “normally” distributed and that
reliable assessments of volatility could be based on data from short periods.196
Add to this the fact that financial intermediaries can benefit from extending their own
liquidity lifeline by developing new financial instruments and shifting assets to others at
the expense of the stability of the overall system, it becomes obvious that cooperative
experimentation may not be the right approach to regulating finance.

3.

Too complex to govern?

If centralized financial governance by unaccountable agents is incompatible with
principles of democratic self-governance; moreover, if hierarchy is unlikely to deliver on
the promise of efficacy given the rapid evolution of finance and the fundamental
uncertainty market actors and regulators face; and if, finally, innovative forms of
governance under the heading of new or experimental governance do not offer a viable
alternative, the logical conclusion is that financial markets have become ungovernable.
Were financial markets self-regulating and capable of naturally achieving efficient
outcomes, as EMH and related theories would have it, we need not worry. The empirical
evidence of repeat and severe crises in financial markets, however, seems to corroborate
Minsky’s insight that markets trend towards instability not stability. This would suggest
that we need a different reform agenda. Instead of trying to govern the ungovernable we
should instead focus on restructuring finance to ensure that it is compatible with our
ability to govern and the normative principles we wish to be governed by.
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IV.

Concluding Comments

The financial system is critical for market-based, capitalist economies. According to
Keynes, it is the defining feature of these systems.197 Yet, modern financial economics
and its equivalents in legal academia – law and economics and law and finance – have
little to say about how financial markets operate, how they are structured, why markets
that were deemed efficient could collapse in short order, and what implications any of
this might have for the governance of financial markets.198 The black letter law that is
taught in law schools is inevitably the codification of past views on finance and financial
practices that may no longer be up to date at the time it is taught or practiced by recent
law graduates.199 The high level of technical sophistication needed to master these areas
of law tends to obscure the dis-connect between law on the books, the theories that may
have informed this law, and the actual operation of the financial system.
Lawyers do, however, play a critical role in the world of finance. They help structure
new instruments, advise market participants on the legality of their actions and devise
strategies for them to minimize the costs of regulatory restrictions. Lawyers also serve as
expert witnesses to Congress and work in committees or at regulatory agencies that are
charged with developing new legislation or regulations. This requires that lawyers know
something about how markets operate in the real world. Fortunately, there are literatures
that offer insights into this. The major objective of this essay has been to introduce these
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literatures to a broader legal audience. It has drawn on older theories, such as Minsky’s
FIH and implicitly on Keynes,200 but also on more recent theoretical advances that build
on them. The most critical factors in these alternative theories are Imperfect Knowledge
and the Liquidity Constraint, and the interaction between the two. They help explain why
markets tend to destabilize even under assumptions of actor rationality and ready access
to relevant information. These theories therefore hold important clues for rethinking not
only the governance of finance but the organization of the financial system itself. They
remain underdeveloped with regards to their regulatory implications and arguably are
over-optimistic about the feasibility of the few solutions they do advocate. This essay has
highlighted some of these deficiencies and pointed to the logical conclusion these
deficiencies imply: our inability to govern finance may be best addressed by changing the
structure of financial markets, not to attempt the impossible.
The analysis presented here can and should be only the beginning of a more
comprehensive debate about what kind of financial system we want to have. This essay
hopes to make a modest contribution to such a debate; most importantly, it urges that it is
too early to close the books on the crisis and critiques of the models that have failed to
predict or explain it, and to proceed as if nothing has changed. It remains an open and
pressing question whether the reforms that have been enacted offer any protection against
similar events in the future. Of course, time will tell. Yet, we gamble on the ability of
markets to generate equilibrium outcomes at our peril. As Minsky put it eloquently:
In an era when performance failures demonstrate the need for economic reform,
any successful program of change must be rooted in an understanding of how
economic processes function within the existing institutions. (…) A theory that
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denies what is happening can happen (…) offers no useful guide to a solution of
the problem.201
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